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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
UNANIMITY IN BROWN
STEPHEN ELLMANN*
No case is more integral to our present constitutional order
than Brown v. Board of Education.1 Its absolute rejection of school
segregation is one of the foundations of modern equal protection
law, and its bold approach to constitutional interpretation has
surely resonated in the reading of many other constitutional guarantees as well. The transformation of the public school system that
it presaged became the hallmark of the many institutional reform
efforts undertaken by courts over the past half-century. In these
senses, Brown is a key component of the rule of law as we know it
today.
The processes by which the judges of the Supreme Court
achieved their unanimous decision in Brown are of special interest
as well. Just as Brown’s result and its spirit have shaped our law,
what was required to bring about this decision may be equally key
to an understanding of the true nature of the rule of law that the
case embodies and exemplifies.2 There are many striking features
to the Court’s decisionmaking in this case; I focus here on one of
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, New York Law
School. This paper was first prepared as a lecture at Columbia Law School in 1992, and
I am grateful to the organizers of the Brown panel for the opportunity to look at these
issues again. I also very much appreciate the helpful comments of Teresa Delcorso,
Frank Munger, Edward Purcell, and Mark Tushnet, the generous assistance of Michael
Klarman, who provided both extensive comments and copies of documents from the
Brown case, and the research help of Sarah Valentine of New York Law School’s Mendik
Library.
1. Michael Klarman has commented that “[o]n a normative level, we seem certain only that Brown is right and any theory unable to accommodate it must be wrong.”
Michael J. Klarman, Book Review: Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It
Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433, 434 (1994) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT 1936-61 (1994)).
2. My colleague Edward Purcell has used another central decision of our law,
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to illuminate profoundly what the
rule of law entails. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000).
741
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the most remarkable, the choice by Justice Stanley Reed to vote
with the rest of the Court in favor of the Brown judgment, even
though he may well have disagreed with the Court’s decision.
It is tempting for us to overlook the difficulty of Reed’s choice,
because we so take for granted that the Court was right in Brown.
Once we take seriously the idea that Justice Reed may have voted
contrary to his own beliefs in this crucial case, however, we can ask
seriously whether his doing so was justified, and answering that
question will help us to understand the legal order in which Justice
Reed lived and which we ourselves inhabit. I begin, in Part I of this
essay, by developing in broad terms the proposition that it is not
always the obligation of the judge to vote for, and express, all and
only the propositions of law and fact that he or she believes.
That proposition may be startling — though I will try to show
that it should not be — but it takes us only so far; the next question,
inevitably, is the question of degree: when and where can judges
justifiably express positions that are, partly or entirely, not their actual convictions? I do not seek a complete answer to that question
in this essay, but I will look for several elements of the answer in an
analysis of Justice Reed’s vote in Brown. Doing so will first require
an exploration of just what he did actually think and decide in that
case, a matter that remains less than completely clear; Part II of this
essay will look at this history. Then, in Part III, I will turn to the
lessons these events suggest for our understanding of the rule of
law: lessons about the role of emotion and interpersonal connection in judgment, about the role of social policy considerations in
constitutional law, and about the moral experience of judging.
Brown is not a typical case, either in substance or in process, but I
will argue that in process as in substance it is central.
I. JUDICIAL CANDOR

AND THE

RULE

OF

LAW

What are the duties of judges in deciding cases? Though this
question may be very hard to answer fully, it is easy to answer in
part. For example, we agree that judges must not take bribes.3 Nor
3. Nor may they take direction from members of the other branches of the government. Thurgood Marshall, however, believed that “President Eisenhower had pressured Chief Justice Earl Warren to retain school segregation.” Marshall says that Ralph
Bunche, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, told him that at a White House dinner he

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR211.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 3

ACHIEVEMENT OF UNANIMITY IN BROWN

21-MAR-05

12:38

743

may they flip coins. Instead, if they make decisions about the facts
they must evaluate the evidence they hear as fairly as they can, seeking to discern what happened rather than to distort it so as to justify
a result they embrace for extra-legal reasons. When determining
the law, similarly, they must sincerely seek to understand and,
where appropriate, to shape the law according to their best lights.
From such propositions as these it is tempting to infer a much
more sweeping judicial obligation — a duty for each judge to examine each case as best he or she can and then to announce the
results of his or her efforts, telling us all and only what the judge
perceives to be the truth of the matter, regardless of the outcome of
doing so. Fiat justitia, et ruat coelum — loosely, let justice be done
though the heavens fall. Anything less, it might be said, is a violation of the central constitutional function of judges: to say what the
law is, rather than pretend it is something else.4 Falling short of
this standard is to judge with fear or favor. Or it is simply not to
judge at all, but to substitute some other function, whether venal (to
serve illegitimate interests) or noble (to serve what is morally right).
Powerful as these reasons are for demanding that judges say all
and only what they believe, we do not in fact require such uncompromising behavior from our courts. We can see, in the actual
practice of judging, two well-established practices that reflect different normative calls. First, courts write in part to persuade, and the
demands and conventions of persuasion constrain what they say.
For example, it is probably quite common that judges, recognizing
that their view of what the law should be departs radically from the
thrust of some part of the accumulated precedent bearing on the
matter, choose not to overrule the earlier case law but instead to
find ways to read those decisions narrowly — knowing full well that
heard Warren tell Eisenhower off in no uncertain terms: “I thought I would never have
to say this to you, but I now find it necessary to say to you specifically: You mind your
business, and I’ll mind mine.” Juan Williams, Marshall’s Law, in THURGOOD MARSHALL:
JUSTICE FOR ALL 140, 151 (Roger Goldman with David Gallen eds., 1992). Warren himself confirmed that the President spoke to him about the South and school segregation,
though as he told it, Eisenhower’s comments, however prejudiced, do not seem to rise
to the level of pressure. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 655 n.60 (2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE] (quoting EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF
EARL WARREN 291 (1977)).
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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their readings would startle the authors of the earlier judgments,
but never saying so. This, the judges may feel, is what deference to
the past requires, or at least what the appearance of deference to
the past requires, even when that deference no longer requires adherence to the substance of what the earlier courts believed.5 But
in the process doctrines are cast and recast to serve the new justices’
overriding purposes.
Still another issue of persuasion may irresistibly enter the
thinking of the justices. The Court has no armies, and its power
rests on the assent of those who do, and beyond that on the support
of the people of the nation. If the Court can justify its decisions in
terms that are more familiar, more courteous and more palatable
than the considerations that might in fact be uppermost in the
judges’ minds, perhaps it should do so. Certainly we know, from
other evidence too elaborate even to mention, that politicians who
seek the support of the people often feel they need to mask their
views and disagreements. So, for example, Chief Justice Earl Warren opened the justices’ deliberations following the re-argument of
Brown6 in 1953 by making clear that he believed segregation, and
Plessy,7 could only be upheld on the basis of a belief in the inferiority of black people.8 That understanding, however, is not avowed
in the Brown decision; there, Warren carefully says just that the separation of black children “from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone”9 — a powerful indict5. David Shapiro notes that “[a] certain amount of conscious dissembling, it is
sometimes suggested, is an appropriate, even a necessary, way of maintaining a sense of
our connection with the past.” David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 731, 739 (1987). He argues against this suggestion, but he himself endorses a
very free-wheeling approach to precedent, see id. at 734, easily broad enough to enable
judges — without any actual dissembling — still to engage in the kinds of revisionist
readings I refer to in the text.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT – A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 86 (1983).
9. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). The phrase “generates a feeling of
inferiority” was itself the result of editing; at Frankfurter’s request, Warren substituted
these words for less subjective language (“a mark of inferiority”) that he had initially
used. John David Fassett et al., Supreme Court Law Clerks’ Recollections of Brown v. Board
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ment, but not as accusatory as the point he had made in conference. Warren explicitly aimed to be “non-accusatory,” in fact,10 and
Brown carefully steers clear of any imputation of malign motives to
the South. Brown does not even contain an explicit finding of discriminatory intent. The same phenomenon is at work whenever
judges recognize their own freedom to shape the law, and exercise
it, but do not declare it, and instead couch their innovations in the
language of precedent and logical compulsion.
The second well-established departure from the idea of complete judicial candor arises from the fact that appellate courts are
multi-member bodies. The presence of multiple judges at once
poses the question of whether each individual judge’s task is to express his or her own views (with whatever shading persuasion may
call for) or to join in the expression of views of the court as a single
entity. It is possible to imagine courts from whose judgments no
dissent is permitted; indeed, such courts have existed.11 But the
United States Supreme Court has never been such a court. Dissent
has always been an option.
To be sure, justices’ views about when to exercise this option
have varied substantially over the past two centuries. It has been
almost two centuries since John Marshall persuaded his colleagues
on the Supreme Court largely to abandon the practice of delivering
multiple individual opinions and instead to join in single majority

of Education, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 556 (2004) [hereinafter Law Clerks’ Recollections] (comments of Earl E. Pollock, who was clerking for Warren while Brown was being
decided).
10. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 315 (2004). E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
who clerked for Justice Jackson during the decision of Brown, recently commented that
Jackson welcomed Warren’s draft opinion as a “master work,” in particular because
“[h]e was so pleased that there was no blame.” Law Clerks’ Recollections, supra note 9, at
555 (comments of E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.).
11. Robert Post observes that “the Constitution of the State of Louisiana forbade
the publication of dissents between 1898 and 1921.” Robert Post, The Supreme Court
Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft
Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1311 n.138 (2001). Similarly, in colonial days, “[t]he ultimate appeal available from decisions of the American colonial courts was to the Privy
Council in England,” Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of
Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 187 (1959), and dissents within the Council, if any, were never, or almost never, revealed, see id. at 188-89 & n.18.
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opinions,12 and for most of the Supreme Court’s history, dissents
were quite rare. A decisive shift took place between 1940 and 1941,
however, and we have lived since then in a world in which disagreements among the justices of the Supreme Court are quite common.13 Even today, though, it hardly seems likely that the many
strong-minded members of the Supreme Court have been in complete accord with every element of the opinions that they have
joined.
If dissent is permitted but not universal, then each justice in
each case must decide whether to suppress his or her distinctive
views, in whole or in part, in favor of the views of the court as a
whole. For such justices — the justices of our actual Supreme
Court — the measure of their responsibilities is neither entirely an
individualistic concern for personal candor nor entirely an institutional criterion of court functioning. Justices must necessarily
weigh both sets of concerns.
It seems clear that judges weighing these concerns have not
considered themselves bound always to say all and only what they
believe. At the very least, judges must regularly choose to say less
than they believe, because they can find agreement among themselves on some propositions — sufficient to decide the case at hand
without gravely distorting the potential decision of future cases —
where they could not reach agreement on all of the legal principles
potentially implicated by the case.14
It may be more surprising to assert that judges sometimes also
depart from the proposition that they should say only what they believe, but in fact they evidently do. Robert Post has closely scrutinized the records of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taft
and found that such distinguished dissenters as Holmes and Brandeis were among the justices who deliberately acquiesced in deci12. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 143-46 (1999).
13. Id. at 138, 175.
14. David Shapiro, in his defense of judicial candor, agrees that “[a]n effective
judge must have a sense of when to settle for less than his heart’s desire, either in
writing his own opinion or in joining someone else’s.” Shapiro, supra note 5, at 743. He
suggests, with some hesitation, that the line between proper and improper deference to
colleagues is that “the judge not materially mislead the reader.” Id. at n.54. Under this
standard, judges surely would be entitled to say less than they believe, in the circumstances described in the text.

R
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sions with which they disagreed, unless those decisions posed issues
too important for them to remain silent.15 Chief Justice Hughes
has been said to have followed a similar practice.16 No doubt jurists
such as these have reasoned that their dissents would not alter the
results in the cases at hand, might introduce unhelpful uncertainty
into the law, and might interfere with the collegial task of deciding
each term’s set of cases successfully.17
To remain silent, when dissent is possible, is a form of speech,
though not a very assertive one. But if judges decide not to acquiesce in this way, the result may still not be completely candid judicial speech. Instead, judges may cast their votes, and write their
opinions, not with a view to self-expression but with the aim of doing as much justice as possible.18 To build a court majority in support of a legal proposition, judges may be willing to reach a
compromise agreement around a non-optimal, but acceptable, rule
15. Post, supra note 11, at 1309-55. For examples of the justices’ disposition to
avoid dissents, see id. at 1311 (Taft); 1317-18, 1341 & 1345-46 (Brandeis); 1340-41 (Butler); 1340 & 1343 (Van Devanter); 1341-42 & 1349-51 (Holmes); 1342 (Sutherland);
1342-43 (Sanford); 1343 (McReynolds); 1343-44 (Butler). Post sums these comments
up by saying that “they do not so much express a ‘norm of consensus,’ as a norm of
acquiescence.” Id. at 1344 (footnote omitted). Post also provides statistics on how often
justices chose not to dissent even though they had disagreed with or been uncertain
about the outcome of the case at conference: “Within the complete set of 1200 conference cases the unanimity rate, as measured by a unanimous vote at conference, was only
50%. The unanimity rate for the published opinions of the conference cases was by
contrast 86%.” Id. at 1333 (footnote omitted). While a number of these decisions not to
dissent surely reflect actual changes of heart, it seems entirely plausible that many reflect only the force of the “norm of acquiescence.”
16. According to John Fassett, “[i]t is . . . well known that Chief Justice Hughes
sometimes voted for decisions with which he disagreed in order to avoid an appearance
of conflict on his Court.” John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. The Board of
Education, 1986 YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 48, 61.
17. For extensive, thoughtful discussions of the factors that might, or might not,
properly lead judges to join in opinions with which they do not entirely agree, see Evan
H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2297 (1999); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1307 (1995); Post, supra note 11, at 1345-59; Shapiro, supra note 5.
18. Thus Kornhauser and Sager, who take it to be “the norm for judges to sacrifice
details of their conviction in the service of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to the court,” think that the limit on this behavior may be much looser than the
standard of not materially misleading the reader that David Shapiro proposed, see supra
note 14: “[p]erhaps a judge need only strive for the best that she thinks achievable on
the given court.” Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52-53 & 7 n.12 (1993).

R
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of law — a rule with which the judges do not in fact fully agree —
rather than permit a cacophony of sincere disagreements to produce outcomes that are not even acceptable. So, as Evan Caminker
has suggested, Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren19 may have opted to
shape a majority endorsing intermediate scrutiny in gender discrimination cases, even though he believed that strict scrutiny was
the right standard, because the alternative might have been a decision embracing rational relationship scrutiny.20 But if this is what
Justice Brennan did, then he was no longer stating only the law as
he believed it should be stated, but rather was embracing something he did not himself fully accept and doing so because that was
the best achievable statement of the law at the time. It’s worth emphasizing, moreover, that the pragmatic compromise Brennan may
have made went to the very heart of the case; presumably it is often
easier for judges to make such compromises on issues they consider
ancillary rather than central.21
So far we have focused on the “all and only” rule, and the actual departures from it, in the context of the publicly announced
opinions of the Court. But the practice of collegial decisionmaking
is not simply the addition, or harmonization, of the results of individual justices’ separate, monastic contemplations. The members
of a court are in communication with each other regularly, at least
in formal settings and no doubt very often in many different informal contexts, from quick notes and phone calls at work to social
gatherings. Individual justices likely rotate around or collide with
each other in ways that reflect the power of individual persuasion
and antipathy; indeed, it was Earl Warren’s signal achievement in

19. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
20. Caminker, supra note 17, at 2325-29.
21. If it is permissible to compromise on a rule of law, it may also be permissible to
avoid ruling on a controversial issue for “prudential” reasons, for example in order to
preserve another, even more important, decision from attack. This is exactly what
Michael Klarman indicates the Supreme Court did shortly after deciding Brown, when it
strained to avoid reaching the question of the constitutionality of miscegenation. See
KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 321-23 (discussing Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on
remand, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956), motion to recall mandate denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)). It
is also notable that although Klarman reports that four justices disagreed with the
Court’s ultimate decision in Naim, see KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 323, they did not state
their dissent publicly.

R

R
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Brown to bring unanimity to a court that was filled with strong and
divisive personal feelings.22
But a judge who seeks her colleague’s support is likely to behave accordingly. She will know that even if she considers this colleague’s views on one issue to be absurd, she does not increase her
chances of winning the colleague’s support on another issue by reminding him of the absurdity of his views on the first point, even if
those views are actually relevant to the case at hand. Is the judge
who focuses instead on the areas where she sees the potential for
dispositive agreement violating her duty to say — privately, to her
colleague on the court — all that she believes? In a sense, such
omissions are manipulative, and it is important not to disregard this
aspect of day-to-day human relations.23 Yet surely we routinely accept some measure of such incompleteness as the appropriate result of good manners, or of consideration for the other person, or
simply of commonsense assessment of what harmonious relations
and mutual openness to persuasion require.24 When we can actually see the absence of such incompleteness — in published opinions which fully and vividly detail the author’s utter contempt and
antipathy for what other justices have offered as their view of the
law — we are likely to count what we see not as a victory for candor,
but rather as a sign of intemperate disunity.25
22. Richard Kluger, writing in 1975, characterized the Court before Earl Warren’s
arrival as “perhaps the most severely fractured Court in history.” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 584 (1975). The Court’s voting, he notes, reflected the presence of three blocs: Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice Reed and three others; Justices Black and Douglas; and Justices Jackson and Frankfurter. Id. The divisions,
moreover, were often personal as well as jurisprudential, and “ran every which way.” Id.
at 585. Justice Jackson, for example, was still upset with Justice Black for having, Jackson
thought, blocked Jackson’s chance of selection as Chief Justice. Id. Frankfurter considered Douglas facile, and Douglas found Frankfurter burdensome. Id. Before Warren’s
arrival, several of the justices were quite openly unimpressed with Chief Justice Vinson.
Id.
23. See generally Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717
(1987). Such behavior might also be called “strategic.” Cf. Caminker, supra note 17, at
2310 n.41 (using this term, but excluding such interpersonal maneuvers by judges from
his study of strategic behavior involving the judges’ voting insincerely).
24. Caminker comments that “a general practice of minor accommodation, of reciprocal ‘going-along’ voting, might facilitate feelings of good will which then promotes
decisionmaking accuracy through improved deliberation.” Id. at 2373.
25. See Idleman, supra note 17, at 1391-92.

R
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If, then, we are inescapably on this road, how far along it
should we travel? If the actual process of judging on the Supreme
Court does not express the perfect play of principle, perhaps it is
ultimately because judges are lawmakers, as well as law-interpreters.
When they make law, we might say, they must act as other
lawmakers do, not merely shading an argument here and there but
bargaining, trading votes, campaigning and in short, practicing
politics pure and simple.26
If we reject this prospect, as I do, then we must ask what the
boundaries are of judging that can qualify as the practice of the
rule of law. We believe, or want to believe, that we live under the
rule of law, and that it is much to be valued. But it clearly isn’t the
abstract progress of ineluctable principle. At the same time, it cannot be the sheer play of power and assertion. I certainly do not aim
here at a complete delineation of the rule of law, but the experience of Justice Reed in Brown can help us to understand this critical
and elusive concept better.
II. THE ACHIEVEMENT

OF

UNANIMITY

IN

BROWN

When we look at the process of decision in Brown, it is impossible not to be struck by how near, and human, a matter it was. Had
Chief Justice Vinson not suddenly died and been replaced by Chief
Justice Warren, the Court might have been deeply divided. (Felix
Frankfurter called Vinson’s death “the first indication I have ever
had that there is a God.”27) Had Justice Jackson not suffered a major heart attack, he might have published a concurrence explicitly
declaring that “I simply cannot find in the conventional material of
constitutional interpretation any justification for saying that in
maintaining segregated schools any state or the District of Columbia can be judicially decreed, up to the date of this decision, to have
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.”28 Felix Frankfurter may
26. Justice Scalia had a similar idea in mind in his caustic opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1001 (1992) (Scalia J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist C.J. and White & Thomas JJ.).
27. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 656.
28. Jackson went as far as to draft a memorandum that could have become the
basis for such a concurrence, from which this language is drawn. Unpublished Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson, Brown v. Board of Education, at 10 (copy on file with the
author). In conference he appears to have been even more outspoken, saying (in Del

R
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have had to wrestle with a similar anxiety about the political nature
of the decision before him — or, perhaps, he was clear about his
own choice early on and manipulated his colleagues by proposing a
re-argument that avoided the risk of a divided decision.29
But of course none of these events, dramatic as they were,
could have produced unanimity had it not been for the vote of Justice Reed. Stanley Reed was a Roosevelt appointee and a New
Dealer.30 For his time and region (he came from Kentucky), he was
a racial moderate. He wrote the majority opinion striking down
one of Texas’ white primary schemes, despite potential arguments
that the particular system was not “state action.”31 At the same
Dickson’s reconstruction from the justices’ notes) “I don’t know how to justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act. . . . As a political decision, I can go along with it –
but with a protest that it is politics.” THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3,
at 658. See also, for discussion of Jackson’s thinking and the impact of his illness,
KLUGER, supra note 22, at 681, 688-91 & 695-98.
29. Mark Tushnet notes that Frankfurter said afterwards that he had “filibustered”
after the first argument of Brown, “for fear that the case would be decided the other way
under Vinson.” TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 215. But Tushnet’s own reading is that Frankfurter was genuinely torn between his dislike of segregation and his unwillingness to
render a non-judicial decision, and that this “dilemma led him to urge that the cases be
set for reargument.” Id. at 193; see id. at 193-95; see also Klarman, supra note 1, at 438
(characterizing Frankfurter’s statements at the Court’s conference following the first
argument of Brown as “intensely ambivalent”); KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 303-07 (discussing the difficulty Frankfurter and Jackson had in Brown, “because for them it posed
a conflict between law and politics”).
A measure of the extent of Frankfurter’s difficulty is that he may have drafted his
own separate opinion. Kluger mentions — though he discounts — rumors that Frankfurter drafted such an opinion, possibly a dissent. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 696-97.
Frankfurter’s clerk that year, Frank E.A. Sander, recently commented that “I now know
that he had some written thoughts of some kind of a concurring opinion. There were a
lot of discussions with Justice Jackson about possibly writing a joint concurrence.” Law
Clerks’ Recollections, supra note 9, at 545 (comments of Frank E.A. Sander). Apparently
Frankfurter actually showed Judge Charles Wyzanski what he (Frankfurter) said were
“the galley proofs of his and Jackson’s separate opinions in Brown,” although Bernard
Schwartz emphasizes that Wyzanski himself was not sure whether the galleys were actually opinion drafts. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 95 (quoting Wyzanski’s comment in JACK
HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 174-75 (1979)).
30. For a brief biographical sketch of Reed, see KLUGER, supra note 22, at 211.
31. The case was Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). For a thoughtful account
of this decision and its impact, see Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case
Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 55 (2001).
Klarman comments that by 1944 “even Southern whites evinced significantly less commitment to preserving white political supremacy than, for example, to maintaining racial segregation in public education. That is, black disfranchisement ranked relatively
low on the hierarchy of white supremacist convictions. This may explain why Kentuck-

R
R

R

R
R

R

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR211.txt

752

unknown

Seq: 12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

21-MAR-05

12:38

[Vol. 49

time, he was no devotee of integration. He and his wife lived in
Washington at the Mayflower Hotel, and Reed was dismayed, after
the Court conference in a case in which the Court would unanimously enforce a long-ignored District of Columbia law barring restaurant segregation, to observe: “Why — why, this means that a
nigra can walk into the restaurant at the Mayflower Hotel and sit
down to eat at the table right next to Mrs. Reed!”32 In 1947, he
firmly declined to attend a Christmas party at the Supreme Court if
it was integrated by inviting black messengers employed by the
Court, and insisted that this was a social matter rather than a Court
one, and that he was therefore free to do as he pleased concerning
it — though he also favored permitting a room in the Supreme
Court building to be used for the event.33 He seems to have owned
a home with a racially restrictive covenant in its deed; that, at least,
is a plausible inference explaining his decision to recuse himself in
Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the Supreme Court held that courts
could not grant injunctions to enforce these covenants.34
When Brown was argued the first time, Reed’s comments at the
justices’ conference indicated he was disposed to uphold Plessy. He
had suggested his opposition to holding segregation unconstitutional already, in the Supreme Court’s conference discussion of
ian Stanley Reed apparently had no qualms about writing the majority opinion in Smith,
whereas in Brown v. Board of Education he planned to dissent until virtually the last minute.” Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
32. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 595. The case was District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 100 (1953), and despite his disquiet Reed did not dissent
from it. Michael Klarman has pointed out to me that Reed also wrote the opinion of the
Court in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), a case dealing with segregation on
interstate bus lines. Though Reed evinced sympathy for the deep South’s “[l]ocal efforts to promote amicable relations in difficult areas by legislative segregation in interstate transportation” in light of the very substantial black population in that region, id.
at 385-86, he held Virginia’s effort to segregate interstate travel unconstitutional under
the dormant commerce clause.
33. JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY
560 (1994) (quoting from Justice Frankfurter’s diary entry of December 20, 1947). See
also id. at 559 (on other instances of Reed’s having “clearly retained many of the attitudes and practices of a southern squire in his personal life”).
34. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 254. Justices Jackson and Rutledge also recused
themselves in Shelley, perhaps for the same reason. Id. Reed and Jackson recused themselves in a subsequent restrictive covenant case as well, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953). Michael Klarman has pointed out to me that such covenants were extremely
common in some cities at this time.
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three cases in the 1949 Term.35 Now, in the conference on Brown
held December 13, 1952, he said, according to Justice Douglas’
notes:
Reed: takes different view from Black [who Douglas wrote
had “conclude[d] that segregation per se is bad unless the
long line of decisions bars that construction of the
amendment”] — the state legislatures have informed
views on this matter — minority here has not been assimilated — states are authorized to make up their minds on
this question — there is a reasonable body of opinion in
the various states for segregation. He points to the constant progress in this field and in the advancement of the
interests of the negroes — states should be left to work
out the problem for themselves — segregation is gradually disappearing; optional in Kansas, Kentucky, and
others. Segregation in the border states will disappear in
15 or 20 years. In the deep south separate but equal
schools must be allowed.36

In short, in 1952 Reed supported upholding Plessy v. Ferguson,37 although Mark Tushnet argues that “Reed’s view that the Constitution was not fixed and his meliorist beliefs opened the way for him
to agree to a holding that segregation was unconstitutional, if the
35. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 558-59; see THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE,
supra note 3, at 639, 642, 700-01 (conference comments of Justice Reed on Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950); and Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)). See also THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra, at 635 (conference comments of Justice Reed on Sipuel v.
Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948)).
36. Unpublished Conference Notes of William O. Douglas, Brown v. Board of Education, Dec. 13, 1952 (I rely here on a typed transcription of excerpts from these handwritten notes, prepared by a librarian at the Library of Congress, and kindly provided by
Michael Klarman) (on file with the author). Justice Jackson’s notes also have Reed saying “[u]phold segregation as constitutional,” and Justice Burton’s notes on Reed end
with the words “Uphold Seg”. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 596. For a reconstruction of
Reed’s remarks at this conference based on all the available conference notes, see THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 649; this passage ends with Reed saying, “I uphold segregation as constitutional.”
37. In a memorandum he wrote for his files the day Brown was handed down,
Justice Douglas commented that in the 1952 conference Chief Justice Vinson supported
Plessy, and that “Reed followed the view of Vinson and Clark was inclined that way.”
William O. Douglas, Memorandum for the File in re Segregation Cases, May 17, 1954,
reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 660.
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opinion stressed how times had changed and the remedy allowed
gradual adaptation.”38
As is well known, the Court decided not to resolve the case in
1953 but instead to have the case re-argued that fall. In the months
preceding the re-argument, Reed “continued to discuss . . . plans
for a dissenting opinion,” and apparently as late as August (shortly
before Vinson’s death in September, 1953), anticipated that the
Court would vote against segregation but that he, Vinson, and “at
least one other justice” would dissent.39 At the first conference on
the case after its re-argument, in December, 1953, Reed appears to
have made clear that he still felt Plessy should be reaffirmed, although he did not express absolute ardor for that conclusion.40
Perhaps reacting to the comments by the other justices at that conference, he came to expect that he would be alone in his dissent,41
but he did not give up, and in February, 1954, he gave his law clerk
“a handwritten draft of what obviously was the beginning of the justice’s proposed dissent.”42 But he never completed that dissent,
and instead he voted with the rest of the Court to make the decision unanimous.
38. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 192.
39. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 567.
40. Kluger describes Reed as having “made it plain, despite the new Chief’s [Earl
Warren’s] resolute remarks, that his views remained what they had been — against
closing up Jim Crow schools.” KLUGER, supra note 22, at 680. Tushnet agrees that “Reed
reiterated his view that segregation was constitutional,” but notes Reed’s observation
that Plessy “‘might not be correct now’ because the states had not provided equal facilities to African-Americans. The tone of Reed’s comments is not easy to capture,”
Tushnet comments, “but he seems not to have committed himself to a vigorous fight.”
TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 210-11. See also the reconstruction of Justice Reed’s comments at this conference in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 65556, which closes with Reed saying, “This is not a political question, but we should not
move to change the law. If there is to be a change, Congress should do it.” Id. at 656.
Justice Douglas in his subsequent file memorandum comments tersely that “Reed voted
the other way,” that is, for Plessy. Douglas, supra note 37, at 661.
41. Fassett, supra note 16, at 57.
42. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 570. Fassett reprints the draft, id. at 570-71. Fassett
himself was the law clerk in question, and makes clear that of Reed’s two clerks, he
(Fassett) was the one mainly involved in working with Reed on Brown. See id. at 572;
Fassett, supra note 16, at 55-56. (Fassett’s account does not seem to confirm, however,
the rumors of the day that Reed had hired an extra law clerk specifically for the purpose of working on his Brown dissent. Thurgood Marshall, for one, heard those rumors.
See Williams, supra note 3, at 151).
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Why didn’t Reed dissent? Despite the intense scholarly attention paid to the Brown deliberations, the answer to this question is
not clear. One vivid story has it that after Reed cast the sole dissenting vote at the Court’s conference,43 Warren continued his efforts
at persuasion, and eventually brought Reed around, at the end of
months of gentle discussion, by telling him, “‘Stan, you’re all by
yourself in this now . . . . You’ve got to decide whether it’s really the
best thing for the country.’” So George B. Mickum, III, one of
Reed’s clerks at the time, may have told Richard Kluger in the
course of Kluger’s research on Brown.44
But is this story accurate? While Kluger says that Mickum was
“on hand” for this conversation,45 Mickum’s co-clerk, Fassett, says
that Warren and Reed discussed Brown behind closed doors, in
keeping with the extreme secrecy that surrounded the Warren
Court’s entire deliberative process in Brown.46 So Fassett writes in
his biography of Reed that Mickum “apparently overheard” Warren’s remark — and maintains that Reed had actually voted with
the rest of the Court at the conference as much as two months earlier, and that Warren must have been discussing the form by which
the Court would state its intention to set the issue of remedy down
for a second re-argument.47
Yet this explanation is itself puzzling. Reed certainly cared
about remedy — in January, 1954, at the Court’s second post-reargument conference discussion of the case, Reed said that “the
Court should offer ‘opportunities to adjust’ as a ‘palliative’ to the
‘awful’ desegregation decision.”48 But it seems likely that the basic
points about remedy — that there would be another re-argument
devoted just to this matter, and that by one formula or another enforcement would be made a gradual process — were already gener43. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 694.
44. Id. at 698 (quoting Mickum, evidently from an interview or correspondence
with him, see id. at 821).
45. Id. at 698.
46. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 572.
47. Id.
48. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 220. Bernard Schwartz reads these comments by
Reed (recorded in notes taken by Felix Frankfurter) as “indicat[ing] that he was just
beginning to feel that the ‘awful thing’ of desegregation was becoming palatable, if
enough time for adjustment was given.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 92.
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ally agreed upon well before the final days.49 Agreement on these
basics was not agreement on everything, and Mark Tushnet comments that “[d]efining a gradualist remedy proved more difficult
than agreeing on the principle of gradualism.”50 But I know of no
other indication that in May, 1954, Reed was “all by himself” on
some aspect of the remedy issue, and if this explanation of
Mickum’s recollection is unpersuasive then it seems possible to infer from Fassett’s treatment of this event that this dramatic conversation quite possibly never took place. In an interview in 2004, in
fact, Fassett said he was “convinced” that this story was “erroneous,”51 and in a 1981 oral history interview, Mickum appears to
deny that he ever reported it to Richard Kluger, in whose book it
appears.52
Whether or not Earl Warren finally persuaded Stanley Reed by
invoking the need for unanimity just weeks before the decision
49. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 695.
50. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 219.
51. Law Clerks’ Recollections, supra note 9, at 547 (comments of John David Fassett).
Fassett also did not believe that Reed made up his mind only as the end of the Term
approached. He comments in this interview that although Reed showed him a draft
dissent in February of 1954 and asked for his comments, “I’m convinced he’d written it
the former summer . . . and was thinking about it and that he was just sort of teasing me
at that stage. . . . It was my view that he had already told the Chief Justice that he would
join an opinion if it was an opinion that he could accept.” Id. at 548 (comments of John
David Fassett); see also id. at 555 (“Justice Reed had done nothing further on a dissent
after December [1953]”) (comments of John David Fassett).
But the timing of Reed’s decision may never be settled; in this same interview Earl
E. Pollock, who had clerked for Warren during this same time, said “I don’t think Reed
made that clear to the Chief Justice until almost the end of April . . . .” Id. at 548-49
(comments of Earl E. Pollock). Justice Douglas, in his file memorandum, appears to say
that as late as May, 1954 “[e]veryone thought that at least Justice Reed was going to
write in dissent but he finally agreed to leave his doubts unsaid and to go along.” Douglas, supra note 37, at 661. When Thurgood Marshall, who as counsel in Brown had
heard rumors that Reed was writing a dissent, “came to the Supreme Court in 1967, his
first order of business was to ask Earl Warren what had happened 13 years earlier to the
dissent Stanley Reed never wrote in the Brown case. Warren told him it would be best if
he forgot about the subject and quit asking questions,” and Marshall commented that
“Since I’ve been on this court . . . . I’ve been able to find out everything about the past
but the Brown case. Nobody will talk.” Williams, supra note 3, at 155.
52. Interview with George B. Mickum, III (Mar. 18, 1981), in Stanley Forman
Reed Oral History Project, Kentuckiana Digital Library, at http://kdl.kyvl.org/cgi/t/
text/text-idx?c=oralhist&tpl=kukohsfr.tpl, last visited January 4, 2005, at 6 [hereinafter
Mickum Interview]. Mickum does not refer to Kluger by name, but he appears to be
saying that he never spoke with Kluger at all. Id.
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would be issued, it is certainly possible that Reed did react to the
need for unanimity and the pointlessness of dissenting by himself.
Fassett, the clerk most involved with Reed’s deliberations on the
Brown case, had urged on him the fruitlessness of a solitary dissent,
which could not even serve the function of alerting Congress to the
need for corrective legislation, and Reed reportedly “acknowledged
that fact.”53 No doubt Warren and others would have discussed the
importance of unanimity in so controversial a case.54 So Reed
might have set aside his own convictions and voted with the rest of
the Court because he felt that a unanimous decision would be better for the country and the Court than the same outcome arrived at
by an 8-1 vote. In the words of his clerk Mickum: “‘I think he was
really troubled by the possible consequences of his position . . . .
Because he was a Southerner, even a lone dissent by him would give
a lot of people a lot of grist for making trouble. For the good of the
country, he put aside his own basis for dissent.’”55
But it is also possible that he did not put aside his convictions
at all. He intended at one time to dissent, but he was no great
supporter of segregation. Felix Frankfurter wrote to Reed a few
days after the decision in Brown to thank Reed for the service he
had done to the nation in voting as he did.56 Reed replied, not that
53. See FASSETT, supra note 33, at 570.
54. Other justices were explicitly concerned with achieving unanimity in Brown.
See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 698 (quoting Justice Burton, predicting a unanimous opinion and calling it “[a] major accomplishment for [Warren’s] leadership”); FASSETT,
supra note 33, at 575 (quoting Justice Frankfurter, who wrote to Reed three days after
Brown was announced that to have decided the case with dissents and concurrences
would have been “catastrophic” and “disastrous”). In conference discussion of the remedial phase of the case (Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), often referred to
as Brown II), Justices Black, Burton, Minton and Harlan all emphasized the need for
unanimity. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 665, 668. Michael Klarman indicates that the justices remained concerned about unanimity in school desegregation cases throughout the 1950s, though they did not always attain it. See KLARMAN,
supra note 10, at 331-33.
55. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 698 (quoting Mickum); see also Mickum Interview,
supra note 52, at 7 (“It was a sense on Reed’s part that it was in the best interests of the
. . . country that the opinion be unanimous.”). Kluger adds: “The only condition
[Reed] extracted from Warren for going along, Mickum believes, was a pledge that the
Court implementation decree would allow segregation to be dismantled gradually instead of being wrenched apart.” KLUGER, supra, at 698. I return below to the question of
whether Reed should be seen as having traded his vote for a concession of this sort. See
infra notes 120-138 and accompanying text.
56. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 575 (quoting Frankfurter’s letter).
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he had decided unanimity was of surpassing importance, but rather
that “[w]hile there were many considerations that pointed to a dissent they did not add up to a balance against the Court’s opinion.”57 He went on to say that the case might better have been
decided under due process than equal protection, but that in the
end “[e]qual protection comes close to this situation.”58
Here we have an apparent conversion. Perhaps this conversion
was evidenced by the tears that George Mickum reported seeing in
Reed’s eyes as Warren reached the end of his reading of the Brown
judgment in open court.59 Whether those tears ever existed, however, is less than clear. Mickum’s co-clerk Fassett noted in his biography of Justice Reed that Mickum missed the beginning of the
reading of the Brown opinion because he’d gone off to lunch
before Justice Reed suggested that that afternoon’s court session
might be worth attending.60 That would not rule out the possibility
that Mickum returned in time to see some of the session, but in an
interview in 2004 Fassett is blunter about his belief that Mickum’s
recollection is mistaken on this score as well.61 Instead, Fassett alludes to quite a different incident from that afternoon: in
Thurgood Marshall’s words, “When Warren read the opinion . . .
[Reed] looked me right straight in the face the whole time because
he wanted to see what happened when I realized that he didn’t
write that dissent. I was looking right straight at him, and I did like
that [a nod of the head], and he did like that [a nod in response].”62 Tears or no tears, though, Reed might have experienced a conversion, and his nonverbal exchange with Marshall
57. Id. (quoting Reed’s letter to Frankfurter).
58. Id. Reed’s letter suggests a change of heart both on the choice of constitutional clause — Reed had favored approaching the case as a due process issue — and
on the outcome, since Reed’s initial judgment had been that there was no breach of
due process liberty in segregation. Reed made these points in his comments at the
Court’s first discussion following the re-argument, see KLUGER, supra note 22, at 680.
59. Id. at 708; see also HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA 133 & 395 n.46 (1998) (quoting Mickum to
similar effect, from the Mickum Interview, supra note 52, at 7).
60. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 745 n.60.
61. See Law Clerks’ Recollections, supra note 9, at 558, 561-62 (comments of John
David Fassett).
62. Williams, supra note 3, at 151 (quoting Marshall). Marshall adds elsewhere,
“I’m sure Reed laughed at that [this nonverbal interaction].” JUAN WILLIAMS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 226 (1998). Fassett’s reference to this
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would at least not be inconsistent with this possibility. His repeated
comments in later years that Brown was one of the most important
decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court,63 and his statements in public remarks that the decision was “inevitable” and “appropriate,”64 could also be consistent with the possibility of
conversion.
But was he actually converted? On this point, too, we will
never be certain. Remarkably enough, three years after the decision in Brown Reed spoke with his former law clerk Fassett about
the case. What he said then was that “he still thought he had the
better of the argument on the law but that it was more important
that there be unanimity in view of the importance of the decision.”65 This is quite a different note than the one Reed struck in
his letter to Frankfurter in 1954. His statements about Brown’s importance, inevitability and appropriateness, moreover, have the
ring of policy rather than of law, and so they are quite compatible
with Reed’s 1957 assessment that on the law Brown was not correctly
decided. Still, we do not know whether Reed’s assessment in 1957
captured his actual thinking in 1954, or whether it instead reflected
his second thoughts in the years that followed.66
Whether or not Reed experienced a conversion, his comments
about Brown’s significance and importance add to our understanding of his thinking because they suggest that he was taking into account considerations of social policy. These considerations
included, but do not seem to have been limited to, the value of
unanimity and the pointlessness of an isolated dissent; those issues,
important as they evidently were to Reed, do not seem to bear on
what he would later call the “appropriateness” of the Court’s decision. That Reed was giving weight to issues of social policy is espeinteraction, which seems somewhat inaccurate (Fassett has Reed nodding to Marshall
and giving him “a big smile”), is in Law Clerks’ Recollections, supra note 9, at 561.
63. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 579.
64. Id. at 580.
65. Fassett, supra note 16, at 61.
66. Fassett reports that “[a]t the time of his retirement, Reed continued to ponder
the question ‘Is abolition of coeducation of the sexes or elimination of all school-sponsored social or athletic activities a partial answer?’ to the problems of desegregation.”
FASSETT, supra note 33, at 745 n.63. See also THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra
note 3, at 666 (Reed, in conference comments on Brown II, saying that lower courts
“might classify on grounds of sex, or they might integrate class by class.”).
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cially noteworthy because he had earlier made clear to Fassett,
while Brown was still awaiting its re-argument, that he “did not conceive” rule by judges — “krytocracy” — “to be the Court’s function.”67 Yet even before the case was decided, Reed had spoken in
distinctly krytocratic mode, commenting that he had been giving a
great deal of thought to the impact of Brown on the United States’
position in the world, even though that impact should be irrelevant.68 It is particularly striking, therefore, that Fassett concludes
his discussion of Reed’s role in the case by saying that “on several
occasions [Reed] restated privately that he continued to believe
that he had participated in the prime example of krytocracy during
his tenure on the Court.”69
It is quite possible to defend some rule by judges, as part of the
rule of law in the United States,70 but Reed did not normally agree
with such views. Perhaps Reed did experience a conversion on the
law, and felt, at least for a time, that Brown was legally correct. But
if he did not take that view of the legal doctrine, he apparently did
feel that he could legitimately concur in a decision that rested on a
mode of judging that he himself viewed as ordinarily wrong. This is
a conversion itself, or at least a profound stretch of Reed’s normal
views of the bounds of judicial authority. Reed may well have put
aside his view of the law, and his view of the proper role of Supreme
Court judges, because he felt he had to contribute to a social
change that the Court had decided on, and that he himself, rather
uneasily, found acceptable. If this was the choice Reed made, it
may have been a very hard one indeed.
II. CONVERSION, KRYTOCRACY AND CONSCIENCE
RULE OF LAW

IN THE

Each of the versions of this story presents its own questions
about the nature of the rule of law. We can discuss them under
three headings: conversion, krytocracy, and conscience. We should
begin, though, with a caveat: In what follows, we will be asking
67. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 567.
68. Id. at 571. Though Reed felt this foreign policy concern should be irrelevant,
it had been argued to the Court by the Justice Department in its brief. KLARMAN, supra
note 10, at 299.
69. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 580.
70. See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text.
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whether Justice Reed expressed his actual beliefs when he joined in
the Court’s unanimous decision, and whether, if he did not, his
decision not to do so was justifiable. These questions implicitly assume that Justice Reed’s participation in the decision was an expression of belief. In the particular context of Brown — its immense
public significance, the justices’ conscious effort to demonstrate
unanimity to the nation — this seems quite correct. Still, it is worth
noting that Justice Reed did not actually speak, or write; he concurred, wordlessly — as judges on multi-member courts normally
do in this country. It is not self-evident that the decision to adhere
to an opinion of the Court should always be seen as an expression
of belief; we do not, after all, suppose that citizens who vote for a
particular candidate thereby endorse all of that candidate’s positions, and if judges believe in a “norm of acquiescence”71 then their
decisions not to dissent can’t be equated with expressions of agreement. Whatever the proper distinctions between judges who speak
explicitly and those who do not, however, here I will assume that
Reed expected, and intended, to have his participation taken as
agreement with the Brown opinion.
A. Conversion
Justice Reed may have voted with the rest of the Court in Brown
because he believed the decision was legally correct — despite his
having taken the opposite view at earlier stages of the case — or
because he believed that he could ethically support the Court’s exercise of a “krytocratic” authority — despite his considering such
authority beyond the normal purview of judges. Either account
suggests a profound reassessment, whether of the law or of his role
in lawmaking, and so the word “conversion” may well be apt. If this
reading of Reed’s thinking is correct, we might examine whether
Reed’s logic was sound, but we would have no reason to dispute his
integrity.72
Yet if we look at the route by which unanimity in Brown was
achieved, we do have reason to see the processes underlying the
rule of law as entailing much more than the play of reasoned argument. On the contrary, unanimity was sought, and planned for, by
71.
72.

See supra note 15.
Unless his logic was so evanescent as to amount to self-delusion.
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Earl Warren. In three central ways, Earl Warren may have deployed
emotion to help engineer conversion.
First, Warren led the Court as it continued a very unusual procedure for its deliberations after the Brown argument. Instead of
meeting to discuss the case and then voting, as they normally did,73
the Justices decided not to vote, but just to discuss, and keep discussing, as long as they needed to — for months, as it turned out.74
Warren certainly did not manipulate the justices into this choice;
they had in fact followed the same procedure in their one conference about the case while Chief Justice Vinson was still alive.75
They surely understood that the procedure they were adopting was
meant to avoid polarization if polarization could be avoided; Reed
himself “said that he favored the idea of delaying the vote; even if
there were differences, it would help them to fix the issues.”76 Perhaps this effect was deepened further by the exceptional secrecy
that surrounded the Brown deliberations.77 Law clerks were mostly
left out of the loop during the drafting of the opinion;78 the Justices’ conference vote, when it eventually took place, was carefully
left unrecorded (or at least no records have survived);79 and no
word of the impending announcement of the decision leaked out
to the press.80 Within this carefully insulated, patient, deliberative
circle, unanimity could be achieved as a collective product.
Second, Warren focused the second of the Court’s conference
discussions after the oral argument on the issue of remedy.81 Per73. Frankfurter said that Brown was “the only [case] which he could recall ‘in
which we postponed a vote after argument for further study.’” SCHWARTZ, supra note 8,
at 85.
74. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 683. The first conference took place on December
12, 1953, id.; the Court finally voted on the case “[s]ome time between late February
and late March,” id. at 694.
75. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 294.
76. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 84.
77. Id. at 95-96.
78. When Warren undertook the drafting of the opinion, he said, the Justices
“agreed that only my law clerks should be involved, and that any writing between my
office and those of the other Justices would be delivered to the Justices personally. This
practice was followed throughout and this was the only time it was required in my years
on the Court.” WARREN, supra note 3, at 285-86; see SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 96.
79. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 694.
80. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 102.
81. Id. at 90.
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haps this choice of agenda reflected Warren’s confidence that the
Court would strike down segregation, and his optimism — misplaced, as it turned out — that both substance and remedy could
be decided during that term.82 He might even have thought, again
mistakenly, that the justices would find the experience of reaching
agreement on remedy so easy that it would help them agree on the
rule of law that the remedy would implement. But even if Warren
was not so optimistic, this choice of agenda may have been powerful. Schwartz suggests that “[b]y concentrating on the remedy, all the
Brethren would work on the assumption that the decision itself
would strike down segregation. . . . Those who, like Reed, found it
most difficult to accept a decision abolishing segregation, would
grow accustomed to what might at first have seemed too radical a
step.”83 If this was his intention, it may have been obvious to his
colleagues — or, perhaps, here Warren was shaping the conference
environment in a way that didn’t altogether meet his colleagues’
eyes.
Third, Warren talked with Reed many times over the months
of the Court’s deliberations. He lunched with Reed often, along
with Justices Burton and Minton, who Schwartz comments were
“the two most congenial to Reed and the most likely to influence
his vote, particularly by stressing the baneful effects of a split decision.”84 The content of these conversations may have been less critical than their tone. Mickum’s recollection may be correct in
substance, even if not in detail. “You’re all alone on this one, Stan,”
says Earl Warren, conveying — in Mark Tushnet’s telling appraisal
— not so much an argument as an empathetic concern for his colleagues that may have been compelling.85
If we think, then, that Stanley Reed, the moderate segregationist, achieved a personal conversion,86 we should remember that
82. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 219.
83. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 91 (emphasis in original); for Schwartz’ interpretation of Reed’s comments at this conference session, see supra note 48.
84. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 90.
85. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 214.
86. Perhaps Reed’s conversion was something closer to mere acquiescence.
Kluger comments that “Black and Frankfurter thought Reed often lacked the courage
of his convictions,” KLUGER, supra note 22, at 585. Elsewhere, Kluger characterizes Reed
as “[a] lawyer whose mind lacked the cutting edge of many of his colleagues’ and who
was therefore often disposed to take the judicial path of least resistance.” Id. at 242.
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conversions are intense and emotional experiences. Reed himself
makes clear that he was never completely convinced by any legal
argument, and his comments years later about having participated
in the leading instance of krytocracy during his tenure on the Court
have a rueful echo. And yet, very possibly, he was converted, or at
least swayed — through an interactive process in which Warren’s
personal warmth and his determination to lead the fractious members of the Court in a patient, exploratory, reassuring and supportive journey towards consensus were probably essential.
From this perspective, the triumph of the impulse for justice
that Brown represents was intuitive and emotional as well as logical
and legalistic. The rule of law depends on judges’ ability to arrive
at decisions about what the law is, and the rules or standards they
state need to meet the test of reason. But they are not formulated
entirely by reason, or, perhaps more accurately, here, as in other
parts of life, the heart has its reasons that reason does not know.
Felix Frankfurter, in discussions with his former law clerk Philip Elman, nicknamed
Reed “the Chamer, which means fool, or dolt, or mule in Hebrew.” Philip Elman &
Norman Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation,
1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 844 (1987). These phrases are not
complimentary, but if they describe a judge modest about his own attainments and
more willing to be persuaded than colleagues as adamantly convinced of their own
beliefs as Black and Frankfurter may have been, they do not mark out a person unworthy of respect.
Michael Klarman offers another explanation of what might have been Reed’s, and
some of his colleagues’, acquiescence in Brown. Klarman suggests that once Warren had
stated his views at the first conference after the re-argument, it was clear to everyone on
the Court that there were 5 votes for overturning Plessy. At that point, Klarman suggests,
it was easier for the remaining justices to see dissent as pointless in terms of affecting
the result in the case. For those morally opposed to segregation, a pointless dissent on
the wrong moral side could have seemed particularly unattractive. Klarman, supra note
1, at 444-45; see also Idleman, supra note 17, at 1389-90. It does appear that Reed,
though initially prepared to file even a solitary dissent, was concerned about the pointlessness of doing so. See supra notes 35-42 & 53 and accompanying text.
Whatever Reed’s degree of conversion or acquiescence, one might ask whether he
was entirely conscious of the considerations, or traits, that were influencing his decision. I take it that judges have a duty to seek self-understanding, but that this duty falls
well short of psychoanalytical introspection. Whether Reed met this none-too-demanding standard I do not know; his ability to observe that he was actually thinking about a
matter that ought to be irrelevant, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, suggests,
however, that he may well have. For an interesting exploration of the interaction of
candor and judicial introspection, see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV.
296 (1990).
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B. Krytocracy 87
Reed’s vote may have been an instance of, or contribution to,
krytocracy in any of three ways. He may have embraced a decision
that although made by judges was suffused with social policy considerations. Even if he did not accept that decision or the social policy
judgments that it embodied, he may have decided to join the
Court’s decision for a social policy reason, namely to protect the
Court itself and the efficacy of its decisions by presenting a unanimous face to the nation. Finally, without necessarily endorsing either the social policy views of Brown or the social policy function of
protecting the Court, Reed might have entered the realm of
krytocracy by acting legislatively — to be more precise, by trading
his assent to the decision in Brown for concessions on some other
matter, much as a legislator would. These different forms of
krytocracy are not morally equivalent, and we need to take the measure of each as a possible component of the rule of law.
1. A Vote for Social Policy
Justice Reed disliked krytocracy, but it is hard not to see Brown
as an instance of rule by judges, and hard not to approve it as such.
It seems clear enough that the judges who decided Brown regarded
themselves as engaged in a task closely related to the making of
social policy (a term I use to embrace both pragmatic considerations and principles of social justice). Justice Jackson was tempted
to say in a separate opinion that although neither original intent,
past precedent, nor popular custom showed that segregation was
unconstitutional prior to the decision in Brown itself, “present-day
conditions require us to strike from our books the doctrine of separate-but-equal facilities.”88 Justice Frankfurter may have been
deeply worried about the lack of legal foundation for a decision he
welcomed as a matter of social policy.89 The opinion of the Court,
the work of Chief Justice Warren, is really quite candid on this
score. The Court declares that original intent is unclear,90 and pro87.
today.
88.
89.
90.

“Krytocracy” is the term Justice Reed used; “juristocracy” is more current
Unpublished Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson, supra note 28, at 6-20, 22.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
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ceeds to rule upon the role of race in public education in light of
public education’s evolving role in the nation and in light of evidence and intuition about the impact of segregation on black children.91 The Court tells us, essentially, that what the equal
protection clause today requires is shaped by these considerations
of social policy. The justices did not believe they could overturn
Plessy on the basis of original intent, and they may well have been
right;92 at any rate, this is what they thought, and what Reed joined
them in.93
Is Brown’s krytocracy a violation of the rule of law? It is so hard
now to imagine a rule of law that permitted racial segregation that
this question seems almost to answer itself. In South Africa, where
law at the time Brown was decided was being turned into an even
more relentless agent of segregation, critics came to call the result
“rule by law” to distinguish it from a “rule of law” that embodied

91. Id. at 492-95.
92. Michael W. McConnell, in a fascinating article, has argued that “[b]etween
1870 and 1875, both houses of Congress voted repeatedly, by large margins, in favor of
legislation premised on the theory that de jure segregation of the public schools is
unconstitutional.” Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 1140 (1995). This is a striking finding, though it remains possible that
even the passage of time from 1866 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was sent to the
states by Congress) to 1870 was long enough for a lot of thinking and re-thinking, so
that these not-quite-contemporaneous constitutional arguments against segregation
may reflect what the Fourteenth Amendment’s supporters had come to believe it meant
rather than what they had firmly in mind when they voted for it. Even if McConnell is
right about the intentions of the Congressional supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment, moreover, the weight their understanding should have if it was not communicated to the ratifiers in the states or to the public at the time of ratification is uncertain.
On this and other issues raised by McConnell’s inquiry, compare Michael J. Klarman,
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881 (1995), with Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A
Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995).
93. I do not mean to argue that the justices in Brown believed that their decision
had no basis in conventional constitutional interpretation (though some of them may
have leaned that way). I also do not mean to say that taking changed conditions into
account is necessarily out of place in, for example, interpretation bounded by original
intent. My point here is only that a very healthy measure of the justices’ thinking was
founded in considerations of social policy, fused (to some extent) with more orthodox
constitutional reasoning.
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fundamental decencies without which the mere use of law seemed
meaningless.94
It is anything but irrelevant to the rule of law inquiry that
Brown was so right as a matter of morality and social policy. But
there is, of course, more to be said on behalf of the justices’ intervention as social policymakers, in this particular context and in general. Most immediately, the disfranchisement and intimidation of
black citizens in the South made the political system far from representative, and created the classic case for Carolene Products intervention by the courts.95
More broadly, courts make their decisions through a particularly disciplined process.96 This is, admittedly, not a very democratic process, though judicial selection is sharply colored by
political power so that judges are certainly not completely unrepresentative of the nation they serve. It is, however, a notably — not
completely, but notably — impartial and dispassionate process.
Both sides must be heard. Indifference to precedent and to reasoned argument is professionally and perhaps politically intolerable, and the duty to do justice to the actual litigants before the
court is powerful. These procedural features are meant, essentially,
to promote wisdom. We cannot guarantee wisdom, of course, and
we are likely to agree with Learned Hand that it would be most
irksome to be ruled by philosophers, however wise,97 and yet the
94. See, e.g., ANTHONY MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
DILEMMAS OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY 1, 20-22 (1986); JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 44-45 (1978).
95. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (envisioning closer judicial scrutiny of government intrusions on the rights of “discrete and
insular minorities,” against whom “prejudice . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”). John
Ely was perhaps the leading exponent of what he called a “representation-reinforcing
theory of judicial review” in the spirit of Carolene. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1980). Michael Klarman has demonstrated
that by 1954 the disfranchisement of black southern voters had been significantly
eroded, but even so only 20% of potentially eligible African-Americans were registered
to vote as of 1952, Klarman, supra note 31, at 69-71, and the political power of white
segregationists remained intense.
96. Cf. Caminker, supra note 17, at 2357-60 (examining the bearing of courts’ special lawmaking processes on the propriety of vote trading and other judicial strategic
behavior).
97. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 73 (1958).

R
R

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR211.txt

768

unknown

Seq: 28

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

21-MAR-05

12:38

[Vol. 49

potential for a contribution to our public policy making by people
whose positions help make them wise is not something to regret.
And, finally, courts’ power is quite limited. Their decisions
may win adherence, but they may also prompt sharp resistance.
The judicial moves to end the death penalty ended with a national
reaffirmation of execution;98 the establishment of a woman’s right
to choose is still hotly contested;99 but the duty to desegregate, or at
least the prohibition on deliberate segregation, has come to be
widely accepted throughout American life. In the dialogue between the courts and the country that may be the ultimate test of
any constitutional position, Brown prevailed, despite all the struggles over implementation and despite all the continued conflict
around race in this country. To borrow the words of the Planned
Parenthood v. Casey plurality, in Brown “the Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution call[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,”100 and, after a contest lasting
many years, the nation accepted that call — imperfectly, incompletely, but still meaningfully. Since the constitution does not have
to be right, Brown’s legitimacy rests most firmly not on its rightness
but on the fact that it has indeed been accepted by the country.
To say that courts engage in the making of social policy as they
interpret the constitution is not, in the end, surprising. It might be
more surprising to maintain that judicial decisions somehow
emerge untainted by the justices’ views of what is right for their
country. It would be especially odd to imagine the Supreme Court
disengaged from considerations of social policy, since we have, as a
nation, chosen to live under a constitution whose text remains
98. After the Supreme Court struck down essentially all of the nation’s death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), as Justice Marshall ruefully observed, “the legislatures of 35 States have enacted new statutes authorizing the
imposition of the death sentence for certain crimes, and Congress has enacted a law
providing the death penalty for air piracy resulting in death.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-70 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (declining to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), in part because doing so in the midst of popular controversy would undermine the Court’s legitimacy).
100. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (plurality opinion of O’Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
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largely fixed even as the conditions of the country evolve and generate exigencies the framers could scarcely have foreseen.101 The
concise words of the constitution may or may not have been meant
to leave the way open to broad reinterpretation,102 but broad reinterpretation is what we have needed, and this process of re-reading
could hardly have been indifferent to social policy considerations.
It may be odd that we have evolved a process of reshaping our fundamental law and social policy that relies in part on freewheeling
democratic politics and in part on the deliberations, sometimes intuitive and pragmatic, sometimes highly intellectualized and almost
philosophical, of judges, and in particular of nine rather cloistered
individuals — but we have.103
All of that, it seems to me, makes it quite easy to defend
Brown’s krytocracy in rule of law terms. Perhaps a more formalistic
version of the rule of law is possible, but the rule of law we have
developed is one that calls on judges to make constitutional law in
part by reflecting on social policy.
2. A Vote for Unanimity
Perhaps the reason Reed joined the Brown decision was not, or
was not solely, that he believed (even if reluctantly, and at that only
by virtue of a personal conversion) that the court should play such a
101. It was Chief Justice Marshall who emphasized that the Constitution should be
read to enable the new nation to adapt to “exigencies which had not then occurred,
and which must have been foreseen but dimly and imperfectly.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 316, 385 (1819).
102. Alexander Bickel, after finding that the Fourteenth Amendment, “as originally
understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation,” Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955), nevertheless concluded that the
words of the amendment might have been chosen to allow the potential for future
reinterpretation, id. at 61. On this basis, Bickel concludes his article by saying that for
the Supreme Court in Brown, “the record of history, properly understood, left the way
open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material state of the nation
in 1954, not 1866.” Id. at 65.
103. Professor, now also Judge, Gerard Lynch similarly observed, years ago, that
“[p]ermitting judges to reject political choices they find inconsistent with their views of
the nation’s basic values may be just another part of a system that on the whole does not
require instant effectuation of the will of today’s majority, but that rather commonly
requires major decisions to be based on broader, more lasting consensus . . . .” Gerard
E. Lynch, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 863 (1980) (reviewing ELY, supra note
95).
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krytocratic role. Instead, he may have believed only that he should
stand with his colleagues since they had decided to act in this way.
Michael Klarman has noted that Frankfurter said, years before
Brown, that “Reed was a soldier and glad to do anything that the
interest of the Court might require.”104 Here, Reed may have decided that he had a duty to enable the court to hand down this
crucial decision unanimously, even though he felt the decision was
mistaken. He may have seen the decision as “inevitable” and in social policy terms “appropriate” despite also being wrong as a matter
of law, and he may have decided that because it was inevitable and
appropriate it should be made as effective as possible. He may also
have felt a loyalty to the other members of the Court, and to the
Court as an institution, a loyalty which led him in effect to say that
he would support the Court even when it was in error, because to
do otherwise might weaken the entire process of doing justice in
the United States.
These are potent considerations. Once we accept that the
Court is an institution that can prosper or weaken, it is hard not to
accept that the Court has some right, and responsibility, to try to
prosper. Once we take a further step and accept that the Court is
playing a role in the making of social policy, it is hard not to accept
that this policymaking should, if possible, be successful rather than
stillborn.105 I do not mean to press this argument without limit,
and I will turn in a moment to several possible reasons for criticizing Reed’s acting on this basis, but it seems fair to say that a discretion to rely on such considerations as these is welcome provided
that it actually makes some positive contribution to lawmaking and
provided that it does not create grave dangers of abuse.
On the first of these points, it is hard now, fifty years later, to
know whether unanimity really made a great difference to Brown.
The movement for racial equality would not achieve widespread
support and (relative) success for years to come, and in the
meantime Earl Warren became a target of intense political opposi104. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 302.
105. McCulloch v. Maryland is instructive on this point as well as Michael Klarman
has (skeptically) reminded me. As Marshall said there, “[t]he power being given, it is
the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and
cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution
by withholding the most appropriate means.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408.
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tion. Perhaps people were not fooled by unanimity into presuming
infallibility any more then than they might be now. Or perhaps a
divided court would have generated an even more divided and violent response. We do not know, but we do know that members of
the Brown Court, who were far closer to the situation than we are,
believed that unanimity was important.106
Yet Reed’s decision to join a judgment with which (let us now
assume) he disagreed, for the sake of such concerns as these, might
also have entailed real costs, and the possibility of such costs is the
second factor we must assess in considering the propriety of Reed’s
choice. Three overlapping charges that might be leveled against
Reed call for consideration: that by concealing his objections he
undercut Brown’s ultimate legitimacy; that he acted in an authoritarian fashion; and that his choice was unjustifiably paternalistic.
The question of legitimacy arises because Reed’s decision not
to declare his objections unmistakably denied the American people
the opportunity to engage in a fully informed dialogue with the
Court about the decision. Precisely by creating the pretense of unanimity, Reed may well have sought to make the Brown decision
seem ineluctable, rather than the contestable product of debatable
reasoning.107 If so, then the dialogic rationale for Brown’s legitimacy might be undercut.
This is a troubling proposition, if (as I have argued above) the
fundamental justification for Brown as constitutional law is its acceptance by the country.108 Normally, Americans pay rather little
attention to Supreme Court opinions, a reality that both raises
questions about the validity of dialogic understandings of the legiti106. See supra note 54. Klarman emphasizes that Justice Reed would have considered the need for unanimity in the context of also recognizing that a dissent would
have no impact on the Court’s result in the case. Klarman, supra note 1, at 444-45; see
also supra note 86. It seems quite appropriate that a judge weighing the impact of his
dissent would consider not only the harm it might do but the absence of good, as Reed
may have.
107. So Richard Kluger characterizes the significance of a unanimous opinion: unanimity “says that the nine men have in union apprehended truth and now reveal it;
more than one opinion suggests that truth may be glimpsed from many angles — or
that there is none, only conflicting opinion among mere mortals, and that another
season may bring another outcome.” KLUGER, supra note 22, at 708-09. The subsequent
opposition to Brown demonstrates that many people were able to disregard this symbolic message, but it remains possible that others took it to heart.
108. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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macy of most Supreme Court decisions and makes any particular
instance of judicial silence or lack of candor less likely to have any
real impact on public responses.109 But Brown’s unanimity was no
mere detail, and Brown was a matter of intense public interest.
Yet the very centrality of Brown to our national political life
means, I think, that its dialogic foundation is solid. More precisely,
that foundation became solid, as the result of the profound social
conflict and reconstruction to which it contributed. Legitimacy
based on society’s acceptance is legitimacy based on social and political processes, and those processes will be complex and not always
neat, but they can generate conclusive results.110
Reed’s decision (understood as a choice to join the decision
for the sake of unanimity) might also be characterized as a form of
authoritarianism, all the more worrisome since judicial decision
making has a counter-majoritarian flavor at the best of times.111
Our present, post-modern skepticism about uniting multiple voices
in any single tune may encourage us to see his choice as a suppression — of Reed’s own voice, of the voices of those who might have
responded to his — rather than a unification. Perhaps so — but
perhaps, instead, it is our current sensitivities that are exaggerated.
Clearly there is a persistent tension between individual judicial selfexpression and collective judicial coherence, a tension that judges
at different times have resolved differently,112 and it would be impossible to say that an effort to achieve unanimity was out of kilter
with the traditions of the rule of law in the United States.
What is most intriguing about the Brown Court’s search for
unanimity is, perhaps, the fact that by 1954 the justices were in gen109. Scott Idleman points out these realities of our constitutional “dialogue” and
emphasizes their significance (and other considerations) in undercutting dialoguebased arguments for strict judicial candor. Idleman, supra note 17, at 1355-56, 1363-65.
110. It is instructive, on this score, to remember the startling departures from normal legal processes in the framing of the Constitution and, even more dramatically, in
the approval of the Fourteenth Amendment. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 37-47, 322-26 (1990).
111. As Michael Klarman has emphasized to me, several members of the Brown
Court were dismayed that Congress had not acted. Klarman writes that Jackson in particular “lamented” that “‘if we have to decide the question . . . then representative
government has failed.’” KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 308; see also THE SUPREME COURT IN
CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 658 (Jackson’s conference comments, including this one,
on December 12, 1953, following the first reargument).
112. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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eral much more willing to dissent or concur separately than they
had once been.113 A number of factors may have shaped the justices’ new readiness for public disagreement, including changes in
leadership,114 the justices’ growing sense of themselves as nine separate justices rather than one Court,115 and the Court’s growing authority to control its own docket and so enable the justices to focus
their work on only the most important cases.116 It is also worth noting that even when dissents were rare, they were more common in
constitutional cases than in most others.117 In Brown, the justices
returned to an emphasis on a unified voice of authority that they
had elsewhere largely put aside. But in 1954 the ideal of unanimity
was a more vivid memory than it is today, and it is difficult to fault
Reed and his colleagues for having reached out for unanimity as
they confronted the awesome task presented to them by Brown.
Moreover, it is simply implausible to imagine that the Court’s unanimity denied the American people a genuine democratic debate
over the role of race, or even that it denied those who follow the
113. John Kelsh notes that the nonunanimity rate on the Supreme Court “peaked
at 86% [of all decisions other than per curiams] in 1947. It has hovered around 75%
ever since.” Kelsh, supra note 12, at 175.
114. Harlan Fiske Stone became Chief Justice in 1941. Stone may have had his
problems as a leader; he also “broke[ ] with his predecessors’ attitude regarding the
propriety of dissent.” Id. at 179 (citing Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise
of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988)). Nor was his
successor, Fred. M. Vinson, equal to the challenge of restoring harmony, see supra note
22, though he had apparently been selected to do just that. See ZoBell, supra note 11, at
204 (quoting Carl Brent Swisher, The Supreme Court – Need for Re-Evaluation, 40 VA. L.
REV. 837, 845 (1954)). Even Earl Warren’s personal skills did not fundamentally alter
the Court’s new pattern of behavior, although in the Brown years, 1954 and 1955, the
Court’s nonunanimity rate was somewhat lower than it had been in 1951-53 and than it
would be in 1956-57. ZoBell, supra, at 204-07.
115. See Kelsh, supra note 12, at 168-70, 179-80. Kelsh also emphasizes the growing
normative legitimacy of separate opinions, even before the explosion in their frequency. Id. at 170-74.
116. See Post, supra note 11, at 1306 (suggesting that “[b]y empowering the Court
to choose its own jurisdiction, the [Judiciary] Act [of 1925] shifted the Court’s emphasis away from opinions addressed to private litigants, and toward opinions addressed to
those concerned with the development of American law”). Post emphasizes that this
jurisdictional change coincided with a significant jurisprudential development as well,
the rise of the sense of law as impermanent and a proper subject of human, including
judicial, choice. See id. at 1347-55, 1380-83.
117. See Kelsh, supra note 12, at 150, 152, 155-56, 163.
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details of judicial opinions a meaningful debate over the strengths
and weaknesses of Brown.
Third, we might maintain that Reed’s decision, even if it was
not so undemocratic as to deserve the label of “authoritarianism,”
was still a form of paternalism. In effect, Reed was deciding that we
the people of the United States were not strong enough to handle
the reality of judicial disunity and needed instead to be presented
with an image of united, quasi-parental authority. If we see Reed’s
vote as in effect trying to protect us from ourselves, then it was paternalistic. We might not see it that way, of course. We could
equally say that Reed was trying to protect some of us — AfricanAmericans — from others of us — whites — and in that case his
decision was not paternalism but a classic instance of limiting one
group’s claims of right in order to protect others from suffering
unjustified harm as a result of the first group’s exercise of its supposed liberties.
If we do see Reed as trying to protect all of us from our own
baser potentials, however, then the question would be whether such
paternalism could be justified. We should not be quick to accept
paternalism118 — but sometimes we may be right to accept it in the
end. One calculus for answering the question of justification asks
whether the people subjected to paternalistic restriction were impaired in some way that would have prevented their acting competently if given unrestricted freedom of action; whether the
restriction imposed was as limited as possible under the circumstances; and whether the risks of harm were great.119 It does not
seem hard to say that the restriction involved here — denying the
American people knowledge of judicial disagreement — was a plausible response to the prejudice and disfranchisement that held sway
at the time in American politics; that it was a very limited restriction
indeed since it hardly prevented the expression of sharp disagreement with the reasoning laid out by the Court; and that the risks of
harm, in the form of polarization and violence, may have been substantial. Perhaps Reed’s calculation (if he reasoned in this way) was
118. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 745-46.
119. David Luban offers a formulation on these lines in David Luban, Paternalism
and the Legal Profession, 1981 WISC. L. REV. 454, 465, drawing on Dennis F. Thompson,
Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
245, 250-51 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980).
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mistaken, but such calculations do not seem inconsistent with a
morally principled approach to governance, and if that is right then
I think we should accept that even some erroneous calculations of
such considerations are part of the rule of law.
The upshot of this discussion is that there is good reason to
accept, as part of the rule of law, that judges may exercise discretion
to join opinions with which they do not agree, for the sake of unanimity. It would be surprising, indeed, if our analysis had led to a
contrary conclusion, because precisely this discretion has been so
significant a part of the actual practice of the judges of the Supreme Court during our history. But it is worth adding that the
existence of that discretion is not a mandate for exercising it, and
certainly not a mandate applicable at all times and circumstances.
The force of the need for unanimity in Brown in 1954 can still be
felt, but we ourselves live in a much more self-consciously multivocal world.
3. A Vote for a Deal
There is one other way that Reed might have been engaging in
krytocracy. Perhaps he neither accepted the social policy basis of
the case nor lent his support because of the practical value of unanimity. Perhaps, instead, Reed made a deal, and extracted a price:
he traded his vote in Brown I for some concession elsewhere.120 If
Reed and Warren actually made such a deal and kept it dark, then
the trade might have been for anything, but the most likely transaction would surely have been within Brown itself. Reed might have
traded his support for the unanimous decision in Brown I for Warren’s agreement to make the remedy ordered in Brown II more
palatable to the South.
Such a trade would hardly have been unprincipled. Brown I
and Brown II, after all, were not separate cases but two phases of the
same case, dealing with the same, single issue facing the nation.
Reed would not have been trading injustice here for justice elsewhere, but rather seeking as much justice as he could achieve here,
in this very case. He also would not have been misleading the public about the true state of the law in the way that justices engaged in
a covert trade over unrelated cases might; instead, Reed joins in the
120.

See supra note 55.
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judgments in both Brown I and Brown II, and they state, perhaps
with some degree of shading, the law that will in fact govern this
field.121 This is not, then, a case of lawmaking in the grand legislative mode of unprincipled dealmaking (to whatever extent unprincipled dealmaking really is part of our practice of legislation). I
share the widespread intuition that Evan Caminker notes, that explicit vote trading by judges across unrelated cases truly is unacceptable,122 but this is not what Brown would have featured.
In truth, it does not seem likely that Brown featured any fundamental trade as such. To be sure, Reed was very much in favor of
avoiding an abrupt demolition of the practice of school segregation.123 Other justices also made clear, as early as the Court’s December, 1952 conference, that they might agree to declare school
segregation unconstitutional, but the remedy would have to be a
gradual one.124 But still other justices, not so hesitant about the
decision on the merits, also agreed even then that the relief would
need to be gradual.125 At the December, 1953 conference Earl
Warren made the same point,126 and so, before Brown I was handed
down, six justices (Warren, Reed, Jackson, Clark, Douglas and Bur121. Evan Caminker has emphasized that vote-trading across different cases is both
generally disapproved and probably rare. See Caminker, supra note 17, at 2331, 2380.
Caminker carefully examines a number of possible bases for this disapproval, finding
many of them less compelling than might have been thought. Id. at 2334-62. He notes,
however, that vote-trading between unrelated cases differs from other forms of strategic
judicial behavior because “decisions influenced by vote trading are arbitrary from the
litigants’ perspective in the sense that they cannot participate meaningfully, through
reasoned argument, in the critical judicial determination”— the justices’ unrevealed
decisions about what to trade for what. Id. at 2343.
122. Id. at 2380.
123. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE,
supra note 3, at 649, 666-67 (conference comments of Justice Reed in Brown I in 1952
and Brown II in 1955).
124. Michael Klarman has emphasized this point to me. Jackson and Clark both
spoke in this vein at the 1952 conference on Brown I. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 652 (Jackson: “We should perhaps give them time to get rid of
it, and I would go along on that basis.”); 653 (Clark: “Our opinion should give the
lower courts the opportunity to withhold relief in light of troubles. I would be inclined
to go along with that. Otherwise, I would say that we have led states on to believe that
separate but equal is O.K., and we should let them work it out.”).
125. See id. at 652 & 653 (comments of Douglas and Burton at 1952 conference on
Brown I).
126. Id. at 654-55. Douglas, Burton and Clark reiterated their view that adjustments
and time would be needed at the remedy stage. Id. at 658-60.
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ton) had expressed such sentiments in conference. Black had perhaps been less explicit at least in formal conference, but he had
certainly conveyed his sense that the effects of outlawing segregation would be “serious and drastic,”127 and Frankfurter had already
emphasized in the Court’s December, 1952 conference that the
state cases were “equity suits. They involve imagination in shaping
decrees. I would ask counsel on re-argument to address themselves
to the problems of enforcement.”128 Only Minton sounds more uncompromising,129 and at the conference on Brown II even he emphasizes that while “we must do something in the area,” “[w]e
should be careful not to issue a futile decree that we cannot
enforce.”130
Michael Klarman writes at one point that “an informal deal
had enabled the Court to be unanimous in Brown I. The more ambivalent justices supported the result in exchange for a gradualist
remedy.”131 Philip Elman, who worked on the first brief to suggest
such a course, filed by the Department of Justice in December
1952, offers an account that may suggest a similar view. He told an
interviewer that what the Justice Department brief had done was to
127. Id. at 648 (Black’s comments at 1952 conference). In conference on Brown II,
Black would make clear his view that enforcement must proceed very slowly and delicately, in some places “gradually – like a glacier.” Id. at 665-66. Mark Tushnet has characterized Black as expressing “an open acceptance of token desegregation.” TUSHNET,
supra note 1, at 220-21.
128. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 651. Frankfurter made
his gradualist views explicit in a memorandum he circulated prior to the next conference, see TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 220, and at the justices’ later conference on Brown II,
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra, at 667, and was the source for the phrase
“all deliberate speed” in the Brown II opinion, id. at 669; see Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
129. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 653 (at the 1952 conference, Minton says, “There will be trouble, but this race grew up in trouble. . . . Segregation is per se unconstitutional. I am ready to vote now.”) (emphasis in original). In
December, 1953, he commented that “[t]here may be trouble in the offing, but I doubt
it,” and then concluded by saying that “[a]s to possible remedies, I am inclined to let
the district courts have their heads in this matter, and not merely see our opinion.” Id.
at 660.
130. Id. at 668. Harlan, who joined the Court after Jackson’s death, commented in
the Brown II conference that he was “deeply impressed by what Hugo Black said about
the Deep South, and the importance of taking those factors into account.” Id. at 668-69.
131. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 313. One might call this a tacit vote trade, and
Caminker suggests that “while explicit vote trading seems to be shunned in word and
deed, a softer form of tacit trading may well be commonplace.” Caminker, supra note
17, at 2332.
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“offer[ ] the Court a way out of its dilemma, a way to end racial
segregation without inviting massive disobedience, a way to decide
the constitutional issue unanimously without tearing the court
apart.”132 But rather than an informal deal, it seems to me more
likely that the justices, those who favored overturning Plessy and
those who hesitated to take this step, were simply in agreement that
if this step was taken, implementing it would have to be a careful,
gradual process.133 If that course had not been open to them, then
the court might have fractured; but because it was available, the
justices did not have to bargain over it in order to reach unanimity
in Brown I. No doubt there was a lot of work to be done in finetuning this general strategy,134 but Reed did not have to trade his
vote on Plessy for a gradualist remedy, because that remedy was already in view.
One can still imagine Reed thinking that he needed to join the
Brown I decision, not as the quid pro quo of some deal, but to preserve the influence that might come from being part of the Court’s
consensus, when the Court proceeded to apply that consensus to
the issue of remedy. I would not rule out this possibility, for it is
easy to see how this reasoning could have meshed with the other
social policy reasons Reed may well have had for joining in this decision, from grudging acceptance of the inevitability and appropriateness of desegregation to a commitment to unanimity. There is
no direct evidence of such an exchange, but that is only to be expected, precisely because such a trade would have been implicit. It
might not even have been entirely conscious; the background sense
of this potential might simply have shaded Reed’s feelings as he
approached decision.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons at least to question whether
such a calculus would have been central to Reed’s decisionmaking.
First, the other members of the Court would have had reason to
remain sensitive to his concerns even if he had not voted with them
in Brown I; his vote would still have been needed in Brown II, unanimity there would still have been desirable, and in any event his
132. Elman & Silber, supra note 86, at 827.
133. On the justices’ reasons for embracing this course, from a desire to protect the
Court’s institutional prestige to a hope of reaching out to moderate Southerners to
their own racial sentiments, see KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 314-16.
134. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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understanding of the South would still have helped shape the justices’ thinking about the problems of remedy.135
Second, there is actually not much sign that Reed played a
prominent role in the progress towards Brown II. Though his law
clerk compiled files bearing on remedy, and Warren’s clerks consulted them over the summer of 1954 in preparation for the Brown
II argument,136 Reed himself — after spending the summer of 1953
very much engaged in thinking about Brown — didn’t take these
files with him in the summer of 1954.137 Reed certainly contributed
to the Court’s deliberations over Brown II, and his comments in the
conference, such as his endorsement of remanding the cases with
directions “that these schools are to be opened to the named plaintiffs with all convenient speed,”138 may well have been influential.
But the crucial moment for Reed seems to have been the decision
in Brown I, and his concern seems to have been to do what was right
in that case, rather than to trade what might have been wrong there
for what would be right elsewhere, even in Brown II.
Justice Reed’s decision in Brown thus does not require us to
judge how far justices may legitimately go in trading, within one
case or across multiple cases, explicitly or implicitly. The case does
strongly confirm the importance of the trade-offs justices make in
their own reasoning processes — here, in embracing gradualist
remedies as a counterpart to Brown’s dramatic declaration of rights.
It reminds us as well of the role of emotion and personal connec135. Even if Justice Reed was not unqualifiedly admired by his colleagues, see supra
note 86, Kluger also observes that “[t]o his brethren, Reed was anything but a petulant
loner. On the contrary, he was an amiable, even-tempered colleague, and the rest of the
Justices recognized that his position in the segregation cases stemmed from a deeply
held conviction that the nation had been taking big strides in race relations and that
the Court’s decision to outlaw separate schools threatened to impede that march, if not
halt it altogether.” KLUGER, supra note 22, at 698. With this reservoir of respect, Reed
could have felt confident that he would still be listened to on remedy even if he had
dissented.
136. FASSETT, supra note 33, at 576-77.
137. Id. at 576. Fassett notes that Reed’s files “contain no documents related to the
1955 hearing [on remedy] except” a memorandum he had written to Justice Reed
while Reed was on summer vacation in 1954. Id. at 578. For Reed’s far greater engagement with Brown issues in the summer of 1953, prior to the re-argument that led to
Brown I, and as far back as 1945, see id. at 561-62; Fassett, supra note 16, at 49-54.
138. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 666. Klarman comments
that Reed “apparently . . . persuaded a majority that ‘[t]hese are class suits but nothing
should be said about it in the decree.’” KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 316.
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tion in judging; no doubt the consensus on gradualism was attractive at least in part because it was a consensus that these nine men,
facing considerable institutional and personal costs, could unite
around.
But perhaps the most important trade-off issue raised by Brown
is the fundamental question of whether the Court was right to endorse a gradualist remedy, one that might promote compliance in
the long run but would certainly postpone the vindication of the
black plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the short run (a “short run”
that turned out to be very long indeed). Whether Brown should
have demanded more from the American people, and whether
such a demand would have been productive or destructive, are
profound issues, but answering them is not my task here. What I do
have to say, however, is that once we accept the kind of social policymaking, or krytocratic, considerations that I have endorsed here,
we cannot entirely exclude similar pragmatic calculations in the service of those objectives. Brown may have miscalculated, but the justices, Reed among them, were not wrong to attempt the calculation.
C. Conscience
It is impossible to be certain, of course, but I think that when
Reed joined the rest of the Court in the Brown decision he felt, on
balance, that he was acting properly. He may have acted out of
newfound conviction about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, or out of a sense that in this case either the demands of social
policy in general, or the institutional needs of the Court in particular called for his support. He may have arrived firmly at his convictions or edged to them only with the help of the warm persuasion
of Earl Warren. But whether his eyes filled with tears as Warren
read the decision to the world, or he exchanged a subtle nod with
Thurgood Marshall, Reed seems to have arrived at his own decision
and acted upon it. I admit, however, that I would prefer to think
that Reed was at peace with his decision, because it seems so unfair
for him to have suffered in his own eyes for a vote that seems so
right.
If I have grasped Reed’s feelings correctly, however, it is still
possible that he believed that the right vote was one that violated at
least some of his obligations as a judge. If he felt the judgment was
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legally mistaken, or believed that it rested on a judgment of social
policy that was not supposed to be made by judges, but still decided
that it was his duty to help make the decision unanimous, then
Stanley Reed might well have suffered a true crisis of conscience as
he sought a resolution of Brown. I do not know if Justice Reed, “an
amiable, even-tempered” justice,139 experienced this moment in
such piercing terms, but we can certainly imagine that judges might
feel exactly this agony of decision.
If we now see the judgment as legally well justified, and believe
that its social policy making was precisely what judges should, at
least sometimes, undertake, we may not easily be able to feel the
nature of Reed’s possible crisis of conscience. In a sense, though,
the fact that we are so far from Reed’s own perspective reflects how
significant the choices were that he and his colleagues made in
Brown. Reed did in fact contribute to the evolution of a legal order
whose tenets he himself might have substantially dissented from.
The choices he made were significant, and if he foresaw their consequences, as he might have, he would have been troubled by them.
If we cannot easily revisit Reed’s moral world, however, we can
take something from his situation. Judges today are no more immune than the judges of 1954 from the potential riptide of conflicting moral demands. To do justice for a nation is always
demanding, and perhaps has become specially demanding again today, as we face perils and imagine futures graver and less free than
we once had looked forward to. The potential for crosscutting demands, moreover, is not really confined to the most extraordinary
cases. In less extreme terms, this potential is always with us and
always calls on judges, and citizens, to reconcile conflicting,
respected sources of obligation. Perhaps it is fair to say, then, that a
central part of the rule of law is the difficult, and ambiguous, experience of those who seek to establish it — judges, certainly, but also
lawyers and citizens. Perhaps it is in the end an integral part of the
rule of law that some of the decisions that most affirm it rest on
decisions made by individuals who experience themselves, as Justice
Reed may have, as almost denying the very values they affirm.

139.

KLUGER, supra note 22, at 698.
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I have offered here an account of the rule of law whose boundaries may seem surprisingly broad. Justice Reed’s decision in Brown
illuminates the human impact of emotions on legal judgment; the
appropriate salience of social policy considerations in constitutional interpretation; the legitimacy of judges’ choices to vote contrary to their own legal reasoning for the sake of the institutional
strength of the Court; and the real possibility that even a justified
vote may reflect a painful choice among multiple valid, yet conflicting, normative commands. All of this takes our description of the
duties of judges a considerable distance from a simple prescription
to state all and only what they believe to be correct. The distance we
have traveled is not infinite, and I do not mean to suggest that each
judicial choice that might be encompassed in these phrases would
be wise or right. But it is probably impossible to state precisely the
boundaries of the discretion that these considerations indicate
judges should wield, and that imprecision is itself a part of the rule
of law that we have shaped.
It is possible to go much further than this. Near the end of his
“defense of judicial candor,” David Shapiro takes up the only exception to the rule of candor that he finds “compelling.”140 He agrees
with Ronald Dworkin “that when a judge is confronted with a conflict between legal and moral right, he may be compelled to lie.”141
I agree that such cases exist; Nazi Germany was one,142 and the
United States may have been another when the Constitution protected slavery.143 South Africa, too, was a place where ethical lawyers could justifiably conclude that they had to violate their
obligations as lawyers, to resist the shattering injustice of apartheid
— although many anti-apartheid South African lawyers worked de140. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 739 & 749.
141. Id. at 749, citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 326-27 (1978); see
also Idleman, supra note 17, at 1387-88.
142. See Stephen Ellmann, To Resign Or Not to Resign, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047,
1051 (1997).
143. On the character of judging, and lawyering, in the face of slavery, see generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). I
contrast the American experience in this era with the course of the law in apartheid
South Africa in STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA’S STATE OF EMERGENCY 231-44 (1992).
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terminedly within the law.144 One might say that Brown was another
such case, and in fact essentially the same case as South Africa —
segregation being America’s apartheid. On that ground, Justice
Reed might have breached his normal obligations as a judge, not
because doing so was consistent with the rule of law, but because
there was no rule of law deserving the name.
I would not make this argument here, and I think that we
should in general be very reluctant to count injustice within a democracy as a sufficient justification for judges’ breaching the
bounds of law. Certainly if we treated each instance of profound
injustice as trumping the bounds of the rule of law, we would find
those bounds fading very frequently. We would also be ignoring a
central point of having legal institutions, namely to achieve justice
where the sheer clash of social force might not. Indeed, we would
be ignoring the lesson of Brown itself, that injustice can be remedied within the bounds of the law. I must acknowledge, at the same
time, that the question of when injustice is so intolerable and ingrained that ordinarily unjust methods are called for in response —
like the question of the location of the normal boundaries of the
rule of law — has no mechanical answer.145 Whatever the force we
144. See Stephen Ellmann, To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest: Bram Fischer
and the Meaning of Integrity, 17 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 451 (2001).
145. One distinguished lawyer, in fact, did see Brown as a case justifying conduct
outside the normal bounds of law. Philip Elman (no relation to the present author),
Frankfurter’s former law clerk who worked on Brown as a lawyer in the Solicitor General’s office, has reported that he had “many conversations with him [Frankfurter] over
a period of many months. He told me what he thought [about Brown], what the other
Justices were telling him they thought. I knew from him what their positions were.”
Elman & Silber, supra note 86, at 828. Elman explained to his interviewer that “I never
mentioned my conversations with Frankfurter to anyone. He didn’t regard me as a
lawyer for any party; I was still his law clerk. He needed help, lots of help, and there
were things I could do in the Department of Justice that he couldn’t do, like getting the
support of both administrations, Democratic and Republican, for the position that he
wanted the Court to come out with [in Brown].” Id. at 832. When his interviewer asked
Elman if all this meant “that in a sense, Frankfurter was receiving a government brief all
along, from you, to which [defendants’ lawyer John W.] Davis never had a chance to
reply,” Elman responded:
Yes, I suppose there’s a point there. I have no easy, snappy response to that.
In Brown I didn’t consider myself a lawyer for a litigant. I considered it a
cause that transcended ordinary notions about propriety in a litigation.
This was not a litigation in the usual sense. The constitutional issue went to
the heart of what kind of country we are, what kind of Constitution and
Supreme Court we have . . . . I don’t defend my discussions with Frank-
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may give to moral claims over legal duties in some set of extreme
cases, however, we do better to understand Justice Reed’s vote in
Brown as an illustration of the law’s capacity to achieve moral ends.
Justice Reed’s vote, as I have interpreted it, reflects the complexity,
but also the supple strength, of the rule of law.
It seems fair to add that both that complexity and that strength
seem to grow out of the reality that the rule of law is not solely a law
of rules but rather makes room for, if not embodies, a much wider
range of decisionmaking considerations. Scott Idleman has recently called such decisionmaking “prudential”;146 another perspective would suggest that human decisionmaking reflects considerations of “care” as well as of “rights.”147 We need not simply equate
legal decisionmaking with moral, or religious, or political decisionmaking to say that the rule of law ultimately encompasses the full
range of concerns that we ourselves actually hold.

furter; I just did what I thought was right, and I’m sure he didn’t give it
much thought. I regarded myself, in the literal sense, as an amicus curiae.
Id. at 843. Elman later maintained, however, that the conversations he was recounting
had all taken place “prior to December 1952, during the period when the government
was in no way involved in the cases before the Court” and its later decision to participate could not have been foreseen. Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949,
1956 (1987).
146. Idleman develops his “prudential theory of judicial candor” in Idleman, supra
note 17, at 1395-1415.
147. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982). I have argued elsewhere that the ethic of care plays
a greater part in legal thinking than might have once been supposed. Stephen Ellmann,
The Ethic of Care As an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2726 (1993).
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